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ABSTRACT
Akerlof and Dickens (1982) suggested thatin a model of criminal
behavior which considered the effects of
cognitive dissonance,
increasing the severity of punishment could increasethe crime
rate. This paper demonstrates that thatconjecture was correct.
With cognitive dissonance,people may have to rationalize not
committing crimes under normal circumstances ifpunishment is
not severe. The rationalizationmay lead them to underestimate
the expected utility of committing crimeswhen opportunities
present themselves. If punishment issevere, then rationaliza-
tion may not be necessary andpeoplemay be more likely to
commit crimes when opportunities arise.
William T. Dickens ER
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Carrbridge, MA 02138I. Introduction
For homo economus decisions are alwayseasy. The tasks economic
theorists confront him with are well defined optimizationproblems where a
straightforward application of decision calculus gives a definiteanswer.
For homo sapiens decision making is nowhere near assimple. Most decisions
involve significant qualitative evidence which defiessystematization. In
the end we are almost always uncertain. After a decision ismade we often
worry whether our judgment was good. Psychological studies of cognitive
dissonance suggest that this worry is unpleasant and thatwe resolve this
worry by systematically altering our beliefs to convince ourselves that the
original decision was correct without doubt. Elliot Arronson (1979,
chapter 4) describes a number of these experiments.
For those interested in the economic theory of crimeone set of
experiments is particularly interesting. In those experiments children
were told not to play with a very desirable toy. Onegroup was threatened
with severe punishment and another with mild punishment for disobedience.
The children were then allowed to play in a roomcontaining the toy for
some time. Several weeks later the children were again put in the room
with the toy, only this time the threat of punishment was withdrawn. Those
who had been threatened with the more severe punishmentproved more likely
to play with the forbidden toy than those threatened with mild punishment
[for example, see Jonathan Freedman (1965)]. The cognitive dissonance
interpretation is that those threatened with only mild punishment needed to
convince themselves that the toy was really notvery desirable to make
themselves comfortable with their decision not to play with thetoy. Those
who were threatened with severe punishment had no such need.Akerlof and Dickens (1982) conjecture that tn an economic model of
crime which incorporates cognitive dissonance, increasing punishment could
decrease compliance with the law.This paper presents a model which
demonstrates that that conjecture was correct. The behavior is possible
because increasing punishment decreases the need to reduce cognitive
dissonance. When punishment is severe, psychic uncertainty is reduced and
people no longer need to develop internal justifications for law—abidin.g
behavior. Although increasing punishment will always lead to reduced crime
rates above some level ——itis possible that a minimum crime rate may he
achieved with relatively little punishment in the range in which people are
experiencing cognitive dissonance reactions.
II. The Model in Words
At most times in people's lives crime probably doesn't pay. The
chance of apprehension is too high, the expected gain is too low, and/or
the knowledge of how to commit a crime is not there. But sometimes people
may be confronted with opportunities. A teenager mayfind out that a
friend makes big money working for a car theft ring. The same week that
teenager may come across an expensive car with the keys inthe ignition..
Alternatively, a shopper may find his or herself with a very valuable item,
close to the door, with no salesperson in sight.
If during normal times the advantages of not committing a crime are
not completely clear, people may be uncomfortable with their decisions to
be honest. For someone who is not a career criminal, the decision to
commit a crime involves a great deal of uncertainty. I-Tow will I feel after
I've committed the crime? WillIfeel very guilty? What will my friends
think of me? What are the chances that I willbe caught? Whatwould the3
rest of my life be like if I were caught? The psychic cost of this
uncertainty may lead people to change their beliefs to convince themselves
that they have made the right decision without a doubt.
Having modified their beliefs to make themselves comfortable with
their decision not to commit crimes under normal circumstances,people may
be less likely to commit crimes when real opportunitiescome along. But,
if the level of punishment for committing a crime isso severe that there
is no doubt in people's minds as to why they are notcommitting crimes
under normal circumstances, they need not developany internal
justification for not committing crimes and may be more likely toengage in
criminal behavior if the opportunity arises.
Unfortunately this logic is not conclusive. We cannot be certain that
people will not in some sense recognize this possibility and persist in
their discomforting beliefs in order to capture the valuableopportunity to
commit the crime if it arises. In fact, the analysis below shows that
people may do this but there will still be a range of punishments where
increasing punishment increases the crime rate.
III. A Formal Model
People live two periods. In both periods they have the opportunity to
commit a crime. People choose whether or not to commit a crime to maximize
expected utility. Each individual's best estimate of the utility value of
the crime is v .Inthe first period (correspondin.g to "normal
circumstances" in the discussion above), the probability of being
apprehended if one commits a crime isp1 and the utility cost if one is
apprehended isc .Inthe second period one gets an "opportunity" to
commit a crime. The opportunity co'-'sists of a lower probability of4
apprehension, p9
.Forthepurpose of exposition it will beassumed that
p2 is arandom variable described by a continuous distributionfunction
whose domain is the interval [p1,O1 .Itwill be assumed that at the
beginning of period 1 people know the formof the distribution but not
their draw from it. That they will discover at the beginningof period 2.
This defines a simple model of a decision aboutcriminal behavior.
Without any further complication it would yield thestandard results that
if p1cv then no crimes will be committed in thefirst period.1 The
crime rate in the second period would be equal to the probabilitythat p2
<v/c .Increasingc ,thecost imposed by punishment, or changing the
distribution of p2 so that values less than v/c areless likely would
decrease the crime rate. Introducing considerationof cognitive dissonance
changes this.
To bring cognitive dissonance into the model afew additional
assumptions are necessary. In its absence thedecision to commit the crime
in the first period is independent of the decision tocommit it in the
second. But, when cognitive dissonance is introduced, people'sdecisions
in the first period may influence their choice ofbeliefs. Since beliefs
formed in the first period will be assumed to affect behaviorin the second
period, the two decisions will no longer be independent.Following Akerlof
and Dickens (1982) it will be assumed that people have perfectforesight
about the nature of their cognitive dissonance reactionand the effects of
changing their beliefs on their future behavior.It will be assumed that
people take all this into account in decidingwhether or not to commit the
crime in the first period. It will be also beassumed that people may
choose not to have a cognitive dissonance reactionif it doesn't increase
their expected utility. This omniscience may seem incongruentwith the5
notion of cognitive dissonance. Certainly cognitive dissonanceis an
unconscious reaction rather than a conscious decision. Thereare two
lustifications for this approach. The first is thateven though the
reaction is unconscious, that does not mean that theconsequences of a
decision aren't in some sense foreseen and taken intoaccount in making the
tdecisiI Unconscious decisions are notnecessarily irrational or
short—sighted. Psychological theory views unconscious decisionsas being,
for the most part, functional (Simon, 1978,p. 3)2 The second
justification is simply that the exposition is easier if we begin with this
assumption and then relax it in parts. This exercise is carried out in
section VI.
Since the decision to commit a crime in the secondperiod may depend
on the decision in the first period and since we are assumingpeople
foresee these effects, the decision to commit the crime in the firstperiod
is based on the. sum of the expected utilities for the twoperiods. The
effects of cognitive dissonance on expected utility areimplemented with
three additional assumptions. First, people can change their beliefsabout
the value of the crime (v) between the two periods. Theymay want to do
this because of the second assumption ——thatif they aren't sufficiently
sure of their decisions they will suffer a dissonance cost (s). To
implement the notion of "sufficiently sure" it will be assumed that if a
person does not commit the crime and the subjective expected utility in the
first period is not at least d utils greater than the subjectiveexpected
utility if the crime was committed, then the dissonance cost will be
experienced. If the crime is committed, then the dissoance cost will be
experienced if the subjective expected utility isn't d units greater than
ifitis not. Since whether the dissonance cost is experienced depends on6
differences in subjective, as opposed to true expected, utilities, people
can always avoid the dissonance cost by believing the valueof the crime is
either high or low.
Adding a psychic cost for uncertainty and allowing people toalter
their beliefs about the value of a crime may or may not affect the behavior
of the model.If people can change their beliefs about the value of a
crime in period 1 without affecting their beliefs about the value in period
2, it would always be possible to make the utility maximizingchoice of
committing the crime or not committing it in the first periodand still
avoid the dissonance cost s They could convince themselves that the
value of the crime was either very high or very low depending on whether
they committed the crime or didn't. In the second period theywould be
free to make the utility maximizing choice again with correct beliefs about
v .Theeffects of enforcement on crime rates would be unchanged from the
model which did not take account of the psychological considerations.
If, on the other hand, what people believe about v in the first
period affects what they believe about it in the second period,there may
be a cost to modifying one's beliefs ——"wrong"decisions in the second
period. For the rest of this paper we will adopt as the third assumption
that whatever one decides to believe about v in the first period must
also be what one believes in the second period and that people's actions in
the second period must be consistent with their beliefs. The justification
for this assumption comes from the motivation for the two—period model.
Period 1 represents normal circumstances and period 2 represents a
transient departure from them.If beliefs are going to rationalize
behavior in the full range of normal circumstances they will necessarily hevery general and are likely to extend to the situations of transient
opportunity.
Putting the above discussion together, and assuming that the
probability of apprehension and the distribution ofp2 are independent,
we have the following statement of the individual's decision problem:
Choose whether or not to commit a crime (ccfor commit crime, nc
b for no crime) and beliefs about v ,(v)tomaximize.
















The first term is the expected value of committinga crime in the first
period. The bracketted part of the second term is the expected value of
committing a crime in the second period and Prob(p yb/c)is the
probability that the person will perceive the opportunity as worth taking.
The last term reflects the psychic costs of dissonance.
If we have a group of people with the same original beliefs aboutv
the crime rate in the first period will be 100% if they commit thecrime or




,peoplewill maximize expected utility by committing the
crime in both periods. Since they always want to commit the crimein the
second period they can believe the crime is as worthwhile as necessary to
avoid the dissonanc.e cost.
If the value of the crime is very low, so that vp1c —d ,itis
clearly not worth committing in the first period. Further,since the value
of the crime is so small, there is no dissonance cost to believingthe
truth and making optima]. decisions in the second period.
It is only if p1c ￿v>p1c
—dthat the cognitive dissonance
reaction may matter. The possibility that increasing the severityof the
punishment in this range may increase the crime rate canbe demonstrated in
two steps. First, possible behavior can be broken down intofour classes.
People may either believe the truth and suffer cognitivedissonance, or
convince themselves of something other than the truth. In either case they
may connit the crime in the first period ornot. If they choose not to
commit the crime and avoid the dissonance cost by believing thevalue of
the crime is less than it is (settingb <v),itcan be shown that the
crime rate will increase if c is increased. Second, it can beshown that
there will always exist some values of c for which people willmaximize
expected utility by not committing the crime and settingvb =p1c
—d<v
Thus, it will always be the case that for some values of cthe crime rate
will increase with the severity of punishment.
To see that people who choose not to commit a crime and tobelieve
b b
v <vto avoid the dissonance cost will choose vto equal p1c —d
note that9
b b








C j 0 0
(where is the density function for
p.7).Thederivative of expected
utility with respect to b is
b b v by v(—) v aE(unc) c — 'c
1 c c
which is positive as long as <v——thecloser to the truth are one's
beliefs, the fewer mistakes one will make and the better offone will be.
So to maximize expected utility while avoiding the dissonancecost, people
will choose b as large as possible subject to theconstraint thatcp1 —
d or vb =
cp1
—d .Inthis case the crime rate in the second






which is increasing in c ,soincreasing the severity of punishment
raises the crime rate in the second period. It remains to be shownthat
people will choose to behave this way in some situations.




wherec is a small number. At this point the expected utility of someone
who does not commit the crime in the first period and believes b=
cp1













by choosing E sufficiently small, thc differenceE(unc,vbv) —
E(unc,vb=v)can be made arbitrarily close to d .Thusfor some
range of values of cv+dIp1
b b
E(u nc,v v) >E(unc,v=v)
Next consider the case where someone commits the crime in the first period






b = E(u nc,v =v)+ v —
p1c
. (4)
Since v— p1c <0 ,E(ulnc,vbv) > E(unc,vhv) implies
E(ujnc,v v) > E(ujc,v =v)
Finally, note that
E(ujc,vbv) = — cE(p21p2< vb/c)]Prp7 < fl + v —p1c
.(5)
Once again, v —p1c
< 0
maximizes the first term so
b
> E(u c,vv) when c
close to zero, E(ulnc,vb
[v -cE(p2p2< v/c)Pr(p2 <
in this range. From equation (1) v =vb
[v -cE(p2p9< v/c)Pr(p2 < v/c)]
v+d/p1
.Sinceby choosing c sufficiently
v) can be made arbitrarily close to
v/c)] ,itfollowsthat11
E(unc,v v) >E(UC,V v)
for some values of c <
v+d/p1
.Thusfor some range of values of c
people will maximize expected utility by not committing the cririe and
believing that the value of the crime is less than it is to avoid the
dissonance cost. When people behave thisway, increasing the severity of
punishment increases the crime rate.
V. An Example
To illustrate these possibilities, consider thecase where p2 is
uniformly distributed on the interval [p1,OJ .Inthat case
E(p2p2 <a)=a
Pr(p2 <a)=
a/p1 for 0 <a 1
E(i )=
Usingthe quadratic formula and ruling out values which falloutside
the range (v/p1 ,v+d/p1)
=s+ v + ci —/(s+v+d)2—(v+d)2
p1
and
—v—d+ /(v—d)2+2(vd+d2) c —
2
where c* is the value of c for which E(ufnc,vbv) =E(unc,v=vb)
and c is the value for which E(ulnc,v'°v) =E(uc,vbv) .Since12
E(uncv =v)>E(uc.,v
=v)for vajues of c >v/p1and E(ulc,v v)
b
E(uc,v v) for values of c <v/p. ,weneed not consider such
behavior. If c' <cthe top end of the range in which people commit the




Figures la and b show expected utilitiesand crime rates for different
values of c for the case where the value of the crime(v) is fifty utils,
the dissonance cost (s) is ten utils, the probabilityof apprehension in
period 1 (p1) is .1, and the range of uncertainty(d) is 100. For c <593
the crime rate in both periods is 100%. At c =593the crime rate drops
to 84%. for 593 <c<1043the crime rate declines from 84% to 48%. At
1043 thecrimerate drops again to 4% and then increases to35% in the
range 1043 <c<1500 .Inthis range increasing p1 would also
increase the crime rate. Increasing the probabilityof apprehension in
period 2 would have the standard effectof decreasing the crime rate.
Above 1500 the crime rate declines, although c mustbe greater than
12,500 before the crime rate WIll again drop belowthe previous minimum of
4%.If the range of uncertainty was wider, for example,if d was equal
to 150, there would be a range (from c =1250to 2000) in which people
would maximize utility by not committing the crime inthe first period and
believing the crime would produce negative utility(vb <0).In that case
people will never commit the crime in thesecond period and the crime rate
would be at a global minimum when c is in the range1250 to 2000.13
Vi. Some Extensions
What if people are unaware, when they aremaking decisions, that they
may later have a cognitive dissonance reaction? In that case people will
view the decision in the first period as independent of thedecision in the
second period and will never commit a crime in the firstperiod if
v <
p1c
.Whatif people always have a cognitive dissonance reactionif
they are faced with a dissonance cost ——thedecision is unconscious and
short—sighted? In that case people do not have the option ofbelieving the
truth if E(u*Jnc) -,E(u*cc)<dand will always have a dissonance
reaction in the range v/p1 c
v+d/p1
.Asa re.sult, the range in
which the crime rate is increasing in theseverity of punishment may be
wider. Allowing for uncertainty about otherparameters complicates the
analysis but as long as people cannot eliminate the dissonance cost without
affecting their behavior, the possibility of more severe punishment
increasing crime rates would persist.
The model presented above is sufficiently elaborate to show whattypes
of behavior are possible when we consider cognitive dissonance.However,
if the model is to be used as the basis forempirical or prescriptive
studies, more work would need to be done. Differences between individuals
with respect to many of the parameters of the decisionproblem would need
to be introduced. To explore the question of the optimal choice ofpenalty
and probability of detection, the model would need to consider the welfare
consequences of the cognitive dissonance reaction. in a more realistic way.
In the model above there is no psychic cost incurred ifone adopts beliefs
consistent with one's actions. In fact, maintaining incorrect beliefsmay
also be costly and the choice of what to believemay involve trading off14
such costs, as well as the costs of incorrect decisions,for less psychic
uncertainty.
VII. Conclusion
Given these qualifications what relevance does this analysishave for
policy? Its primary contribution is in providinganother explanation for
some otherwise puzzling empirical results. Moststudies indicate that
increasing the likelihood of punishment deters crime,but increased
punishment is not always associated with lowercrime rates.This is
Beyleveld's (1980, p. 306) conclusion after a survey ofsocial science
research on deterrence. Several other explanations have been proposed,hut
they can only explain higher crime rates for specificcrimes or higher
rates ofrecidivism.4 If future studies suggest that increasing punishment
does not reduce the number of first—time offenders, then cognitive
dissonance may be playing a role in determining the level ofcriminal
activity. If it is, then the most effective way toreduce criminal
activity is to reduce the number and the attractivenessof opportunities to
commit crimes. Trying to reduce the crime rate by increasing the severity
of punishment could have disastrous consequences ——itcould cause a leap
in the crime rate as people are transformed from internallymotivated law
abiders into criminal opportunists.Footnotes
*Iwould like to thank Phillip Bokovoy and AlanMcrthur for research
assistance and helpful comments and KevinLang and an anonymous
referee for several suggested improvements.I would also like to
thank the Institute of Industrial Relationsat Berkeley and the
National Science Foundation forgenerous research support.
1. It is assumed here and elsewhere in thispaper that a person will not
commit a crime if the expected utility isexactly equal to that if
they do not commit the crime.
2. In economics we usuallyuse the term rational to meanmaking the best
possible use of available information.
In this sense it is clear
that many unconscious decisionprocesses are as rational, if notmore
rational, than conscious processes.Milton Friedman's famousStory
of the billiards player whomakes perfect threecushionshots without
formal analysis or thepilot who corrects the airplanescourse with-
out consciously considering theextremely complicated physics problem
involved in the control ofan aircraft are two examples. Justbecause
we are not consciously aware of theway in which a judgment is made
does not mean that theprocess didn't involve the bestpossible use of
available informatior)
3 Note that the lower end of thisrange is not given by the solution to
the quadratic since for values ofc <1500,E(unc,vbv) =1)
Thus the lower end is the valuE ot tor whii
(unc,vL == 016
4For exauipte, ithasbog heo: api(:a. 1urisrneri for
murderremoves any incentive murderers may have for not repeating the
crime. Jones and Stock (1981) argue that if punishment involves
reducing social status and integration, more severe reductions of
social status and integration may increase recidivism. Finally, Myers
(1980) argues that if prisons serve as training grounds for criminal
skills or if legitimate job opportunities diminish, longer prison
terms may lead to higher recidivism rates.References
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